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Time for a New Approach? Federalism
and Foreign Affairs After Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council
ABSTRACT

On June 19, 2000, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council-a much-anticipated decision involving the intersection
of federalism and foreign relations-the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down a Massachusetts law restricting state purchases
from companies doing business in Burma. Crosby represents
the Court's first consideration not only of local selective
purchasinglaws but, more importantly, its first consideration of
the sort of subnational sanctions first developed by state and
local governments during the anti-apartheid campaign of the
1980's. Thus, Crosby may pose an obstacle to human rights
activism by local governments using economic sanctions to
punish perceived human-rights offenders.
Because the Court's decision in Crosby was based on
narrow, non-constitutional grounds, however, it probably will
not stand as the final word on foreign policymaking by state
and local actors. Indeed, the question of the extent to which the
Constitution constrains local foreign policymaking remains
unresolved, and the debate over this issue continues unabated.
This debate has resulted in the formation of two camps: the
majority, or conventional, view and the minority, or revisionist,
view.
Adopting the arguments of the revisionist camp, this Note
contributes to the debate by proposing a new approach to
balance re-emergent federalism concerns against the need for a
unified and consistent national foreign policy. As long as the
Supreme Court continues to endorse a legitimate role for the
states in domestic affairs, pressure will mount from
commentators, local governments, and activists for the Court
likewise to return to an understandingof foreign affairs that is
closer to that which prevailed during the founding and first
century of U.S. history. Furthermore, globalization and the
growing ability of nations to target their retaliation against
subnational actors have greatly weakened the functional
argument for abrogating states' rights in the field of foreign
affairs.
Given these trends, this Note argues that despite the
setback of Crosby, it seems only a matter of time until the tide
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turns, and courts and commentators endorse a framework of
foreign affairs law analysis more closely resembling that which
prevailed in the United States for much of its history.
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1. INTRODUCTION

On June 19, 2000, in a much-anticipated decision involving the
intersection of federalism and foreign relations, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down a Massachusetts law restricting state purchases
from companies doing business in Burma.'
Crosby v. National

1.

Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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Foreign Trade Council represents the Supreme 'Court's first
consideration of the sort of subnational sanctions developed by state
and local governments during the anti-apartheid campaign of the
1980s. 2 Because it invalidated a state law imposing sanctions on a
foreign nation, "the Court's ruling represents a significant setback for
'3
human rights activism on that model."
Yet, because the Court's decision in Crosby was based on narrow,
non-constitutional grounds, commentators have not viewed it as the
final word on foreign policymaking by state and local actors. 4 Indeed,
as one frequent commentator on foreign affairs law has observed, "the
broader question of constitutional constraints on state and local
foreign policymaking comes away from Crosby largely untouched."5
It is no surprise, then, that commentators believe that the debate
over how federalism principles should apply in the realm of foreign
relations will continue unabated. 6 This debate has resulted in the
formation of two camps: the majority, or conventional, view and the
minority, or revisionist, view.
Adopting the arguments of the revisionist camp, this Note
attempts to contribute to this debate by proposing a new approach to
balancing federalism concerns against the need for a unified and
consistent national foreign policy.

II.BACKGROUND
A. The Massachusetts Law
7
Massachusetts enacted the law invalidated by Crosby in 1996.
The law prohibited state agencies, in most instances, from buying
goods or services from anyone doing business with the Union of
The law included domestic and foreign
Myanmar (Burma).8
corporations and broadly defined "doing business."9 In this respect,
the law was similar to divestment laws passed by state and local

2.
Peter J. Spiro, U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Down State Burma Law, ASIL
INSIGHTS (June 2000), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh46.htm.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.

6.
7.
8.
1998).
9.

Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (1996) (repealed 2000).
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-M.
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governments in the United States during the 1980s as a way to
oppose South Africa's apartheid regime.10
authorized
the
statute
procurement
sanctions
The
Massachusetts Operational Services Division (OSD) to establish a
"restricted purchase list" of companies "doing business with Burma"
as defined in the statute. 1 Once OSD made a preliminary finding
that a company was doing business with Burma, the company was
12
placed on the restricted list, unless it was able to refute the finding.
Under the Massachusetts law, the Commonwealth could buy services
or goods from a "restricted purchase list" company only when: (1) the
procurement was essential and the restriction would eliminate the
only bid or offer;' 3 (2) the Commonwealth was purchasing certain
medical supplies; 14 or (3) there was no "comparable low bid or offer"
by an unrestricted bidder. 15 In bidding situations, the statute
precluded a restricted list company from winning a bid with the
Commonwealth unless its offer was at least ten percent lower than
6
the lowest bid by an unrestricted company.
Massachusetts passed the bill-known locally as the "Burma
law"-after Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel-prize-winning leader of
Burma's democratic opposition, implored foreign companies not to do
business with Burma's ruling junta. 17 The Massachusetts legislature
"obliged her by dusting off an old anti-apartheid sanctions bill,
changing the words 'South Africa' to 'Burma'. . . and passing it." 8
B. Similar State and Local Laws
According to one study, the federal, state, and local governments
of the United States have imposed 142 unilateral sanctions on fortyone countries since 1993.19 According to another study commissioned
by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), sanctioned
countries represent 2.3 billion potential consumers of U.S. goods and

10.
Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341,
343 (1999).
11.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-M.
12.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-M.
13.
Id. § 22H(b).
14.
Id. § 221.
15.
Id. § 22H(d).
16.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
17.
A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, EcONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997,
at 32 [hereinafter The Mass that Roared].
Id.
18.
19.
Going Slow on Embargoes, Editorial, DENV. ROcKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 11,
1997, at 39A.
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services and $790 billion worth of export markets, or ten percent of
20
the world's total.
Human rights activists and government officials modeled their
campaign to mobilize state and local governments in the campaign
against Burma on laws aimed at South Africa's apartheid regime;
some 130 cities and twenty-eight states in the mid-1980s passed such
legislation, much of the legislation similar to the Massachusetts
enactment. 2 1 Recently, more than a dozen cities and counties,
including New York City and Berkeley, California, have followed
Massachusetts and adopted sanctions to prohibit government
agencies from buying goods and services from companies doing
business in Burma, China, and Nigeria. 22 California, Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas all
considered similar sanctions at the state level before ultimately
23
rejecting them.
Among the state and local governments that joined
Massachusetts' campaign against Burma by passing or considering
"selective purchasing ordinances" were the cities of Berkeley, New
York, Oakland, and San Francisco, as well as the governments of
date, more than a
smaller towns, such as Madison, Wisconsin. 2 4 To
25
dozen cities have passed anti-Burma legislation.
One consistent feature of these sanctions is that "they go beyond
barring the political entity itself from dealing with the targeted
country to imposing the dreaded secondary boycott on companies that
do business in the targeted country. '26 All of these local initiatives
"employ immediate economic disengagement as a punitive measure
against the oppressive regime in Rangoon." 27 As discussed below,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S.
20.
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES, 1993-1996 (1997).

Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts,
21.
CATO Trade Policy Analysis No. 1 (Mar. 26, 1998), at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/
pas/tpa-001.html; see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1638 (1997).
22.
Hadar, supra note 21.
23.
Id.
24.
The story of one city's decision to sanction companies doing business in
Burma illustrates the moralistic and sometimes quixotic nature of many of these laws.
The Los Angeles City Council passed a selective purchasing law similar to
Massachusetts over a month and a half after the federal district court in Massachusetts
ruled that such measures violated the Constitution. Ignoring this ruling, the Los
Angeles Council voted unanimously on December 16 to ban companies that do business
in Burma from bidding for city contracts. Jim Lobe, Los Angeles Votes Burma
at
1992),
(Dec.
16,
ECONET
Ruling,
Court
Despite
Sanctions
http://www.igc.org/igc/erhg/ burma sanctions.html.
25.
Hadar, supranote 21.
26.
David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and
Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties With Burma, 30 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 177 (1997).
27.
Id.

296

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:291

this feature raises questions concerning the states' invocation of the
market participant exception to the dormant commerce clause. The
National Foreign Trade Council's (NFTC) challenge to the
Massachusetts law in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council is
it represents the only legal challenge
particularly important because
28
laws.
purchasing
selective
to
C. Domestic Opposition to the Laws
While opponents of economic sanctions are critical of the efficacy
of sanctions imposed by the federal government, they are especially
troubled by the questionable constitutionality of state and local trade
curbs aimed at foreign countries and companies, such as
Massachusetts' Burma law. 29 To such critics, local action in matters
that touch on foreign affairs represents the replacement of the old,
unified conduct of U.S. foreign policy with an interest group-based
foreign policy that permits small but vocal activist groups to impose
their political agendas on U.S. foreign policy.3 0 Or, as one journalist
has stated, "trying to monitor the foreign policy of 50 states and 7,284
municipalities is, to put it mildly, a nightmare for companies and
31
national governments alike."
U.S. businesses opposed the passage of state and local sanctions
against Burma and other nations on economic grounds.32 Apple
Computer, for example, eliminated its operations in Burma in
October 1996, citing the threat to its business posed by
Massachusetts' adoption of the sanctions law.33 Eastman Kodak and
Hewlett-Packard likewise cited the law as the reason for their
34
decisions to divest Burmese holdings.
D. InternationalProtestsAgainst the State and Local Laws
Massachusetts' "blacklist" also included major Japanese and
European firms, including Guiness, Nissan, Siemans, Sony, and

Farhan Haq, Massachusetts Defends Sanctions Laws, INTER PRESS SERVICE
28.
(July 29, 1998), at http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/ju198/1822_067.html.
Hadar, supra note 21 (criticizing the fact that "Massachusetts and more
29.
than a dozen counties and cities, including New York City and Berkeley, California,
have already adopted sanctions that bar government purchases from companies that do
business in China, Burma, and Nigeria" and that "California, Texas, New York, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Connecticut, and Rhode Island all considered similar sanctions
before rejecting or tabling them").
Id.
30.
Kevin Whitelaw, The Very Long Arm of the Law: Is the World Ready for
31.
7,284 Secretariesof State?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 14, 1996, at 57.
32.
Tom Mintier, U.S. businesses criticize Burma sanctions, CNN INTERACTIVE
(Apr. 24, 1997), at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/24burma/index.html.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
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Toyota. 3 5 After its passage, the law provoked protests from Japan
and the European Union, both of which challenged the measure in
the World Trade Organization as a violation of U.S. obligations under
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. 36 Among other
complaints, these governments raised the issue that by passing its
selective procurement law, Massachusetts violated the General
Procurement Agreement, an international accord signed by
Massachusetts and thirty-eight other U.S. states.3 7 According to the
terms of the agreement, procurement contracts must be based solely
38
on economic criteria.
Although the WTO case was put on hold while U.S. courts
adjudicated the constitutionality of the law-and was then
withdrawn after the Supreme Court invalidated the lawcommentators expected at the time the EU and Japan filed their
complaints that those nations would "take the United States to task"
39
if the law were upheld.
E. FederalSanctions Against Burma

1. Congressional Action
Before noting the specific provisions of the federal government's
anti-Burma sanctions, it bears mentioning that, according to
numerous commentators, "unilateral sanctions are now the tool of
choice for U.S. foreign policy." 40 The government's use of unilateral
sanctions as a foreign policy tool has proliferated greatly since the
demise of the Soviet Union, becoming "a central trend in U.S. foreign'
policy in the post-Cold War era. '41 Since 1918, the United States has
imposed unilateral economic sanctions against other nations over 115
times. 42 Sixty-one of those sanctions were imposed during the
Clinton administration. 43 Even more remarkably, over seventy-five
countries, constituting over two-thirds of the world's population, are

35.
The Mass that Roared, supra note 17, at 32.
Haq, supra note 28.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Missy Ryan, 10 Sovereignty Issues Now Before the WTO, 31 NAT'L J. 3384
39.
(1999), availableat http://nationaljournal.com/members/news/1999/11/1119nj3.htm.
40.
James Finch et al., With a Broad Brush: The Federal Revolution of
Sanctions Against Burma, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 323, 336 (1999); see, e.g.,
Hadar, supra note 21; Bruce Bartlett, Trade Sanctions Normally Don't Work, DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 19, 1997, at A18.
41.
Hadar, supra note 21.
42.
Finch et al., supra note 40, at 336.
43.
Id.
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now subject to unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the federal
44
government.
In 1990, Congress passed the Customs and Trade Act, which
45
enabled the President to impose new sanctions against Burma.46
Then-President Bush, however, declined to act on the authorization.
Due to the growing outcry against the treatment of Burmese
citizens, in September 1996-three months after Massachusetts
enacted its law-Congress passed a statute imposing federal
sanctions against Burma. 47 The law authorized the President to ban
all new investment by U.S. companies in Burma and directed him to
develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to help restore
democracy in Burma. 48 This amendment authorized the President to
prohibit new investment in Burma, unless he found that imposing
49
such a ban would be contrary to U.S. interests.
2. Executive Action
On May 20, 1997, "in response to the Burmese Government's
large scale repression of and violence against the Democratic
opposition," President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,047,
declaring a national emergency with respect to Burma. 50 The order
took effect the following day and banned most new U.S. investment in
Burma. 5 1 The order did, however, exempt from the prohibition the
sale or purchase of goods or services to or from Burma, if the
transaction did not result in an equity interest in a Burmese
52
enterprise for the U.S. citizen.
Despite variations in implementation, the Congressional
measure and the President's Executive Order of May 1997 share a
basic prohibition on U.S. investment in Burma-the ban on "new
investment" by a "United States person" after May 21, 1997, where
such activity is "undertaken pursuant to an agreement ... with the
Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma. '53 To
be subject to the ban on investment in Burma, such an agreement

44.
Id. at 336-37.
Hadar, supra note 21.
45.
Id.
46.
See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
47.
Appropriations Act, 1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to -167 (enacted by the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-128, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to
-172).
48.
Id. § 570(b).
Id.
49.
50.
Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. §
1701 app., 219-21 (2000).
51.
Id.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
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also must include the following: (1) entering into a contract that
includes the economic development of resources located in Burma; (2)
entering into a contract providing for the general supervision and
guarantee of another person's performance of a contract to develop
resources located in Burma; (3) buying an ownership share in the
economic development of Burmese resources; and (4) entering into a
contract to participate in royalties, earnings, or profits from the
economic development of Burmese resources, without regard to the
54
form of participation.
F. Opposition to FederalSanctions Against Burma
Opponents of unilateral economic sanctions by the United States
against Burma argue that such sanctions antagonize U.S. allies,
55
impair U.S. economic interests, and ultimately are ineffective.
Opponents also criticize both the federal law and the Executive
Order, together with its subsequently propounded regulations, for
failing to explain how the sanctions will improve human rights in
Burma.5 6 These critics further argue that the sanctions remove the
President's flexibility in dealing with the Burmese government, since
the administration may rjot remove the sanctions, once implemented,
57
without Congressional approval.
More dramatically, opponents of the sanctions argue that
prohibiting investment in Burma has pushed Burma into the arms of
China. 58 The Chinese government is interested in bringing Burma
into its political orbit because of Burma's strategic location near the
Bay of Bengal. 59 Proponents of the view that Burma is rapidly
developing closer ties with China as the West isolates it note China's
construction of radar bases on Burma's two islands in the Indian
Ocean. 60 Indeed, some U.S. allies oppose isolating Burma because
they fear that the policy will aid China's attempt to enlist it as a
61
military ally.
Observers most concerned with the sanctions' effects on U.S.
interests add that the cumulative result has been virtually to
eliminate U.S. influence in Burma, particularly on such issues as
human rights and narcotics control. These critics contend that the
U.S. government's 62 advice--often a moderating influence in

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
A23.
61.
62.

Id.
Finch et al., supra note 40, at 326; see also Hadar supra note 21.
Finch et al., supra note 40, at 337.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 337.
Id.; see also Hadar, supra note 21.
Peter W. Rodman, The Burma Dilemma, WASH. POST, May 29, 1997, at
Id.
Finch et al., supra note 40, at 338.
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ignored in Burma since the
developing countries-has been largely
63
federal government imposed sanctions.
Not surprisingly, NAM strongly criticized the Executive Order
implementing the sanctions, as well as the congressional enactment
that authorized it. 64 After Congress enacted federal sanctions
against Burma, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
rejected the law's proposal for economic sanctions against Burma to
punish its ruling junta, insisting that ASEAN's policy of "constructive
engagement" with Burma would encourage the country to relax its
repression of pro-democracy activists.6 5 No doubt, NAM's criticism of
the Burmese sanctions was motivated by studies like the one
conducted by a presidential commission in 1985, which estimated
that the United States was losing $4.7 billion in exports annually
from such controls.6 6 Another study, done in 1994 by the Council on
Competitiveness, considered eight cases of trade sanctions; the study
in the
found a loss of six billion dollars in sales annually, 6resulting
7
elimination of as many as 125,000 export-related jobs.
At best, observers estimate that sanctions have worked only
about one-third of the time since World War 1.68 The impact of
sanctions has declined since 1990, although they remain popular
foreign policy tools among politicians and the public.6 9 These dual
features-ineffectiveness and popularity-have led one business
lobbyist to refer to unilateral U.S. sanctions as "chicken soup
Nevertheless, while many critics of the federal
diplomacy. '70
sanctions have challenged their efficacy, none have questioned their
constitutionality.

III. THE FEDERAL COURTS' ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL CASE

In May 1998, the NFTC, an industry association of almost six
hundred U.S. companies engaged in foreign trade, challenged the
Massachusetts law, arguing that it was an unconstitutional and
preempted by the federal statute and Executive Order imposing

Id.
63.
Mintier, supra note 32.
64.
Asian forum rejects Burma sanctions, CNN INTERACTIVE (July 23, 1996), at
65.
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9607/23/burma/index.html.
Bruce Bartlett, Trade Sanctions Normally Don't Work, DETROIT NEWS,
66.
Mar. 19, 1997, at All.
Id.
67.
Dick Kirschten, Economic Sanctions: Speaking Loudly But Carrying Only a
68.
Small Stick, 29 NAT'L J. 14 (1997).

69.
70.

Id.
Id. (quoting William C. Lane, chief lobbyist for Caterpillar, Inc.).
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sanctions on Burma. 7 1 At the time the NFTC filed the lawsuit, its
President alleged that the Massachusetts law "directly intrudes on
the exclusive power of the national government to determine foreign
policy, discriminates against companies engaged in foreign commerce,
and conflicts with the policies and objectives of the federal statute
imposing sanctions on [Burma]." 72 The NFTC predicted that the
lawsuit would be an important test of the constitutionality of state
73
and local sanctions.
In November 1998, the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
Massachusetts
struck down the Massachusetts
law
as
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it impermissibly infringed on
the federal government's power to regulate foreign affairs. 74 The
District Court invalidated the Massachusetts law on two grounds: (1)
the Constitution grants the federal government exclusive authority
over foreign affairs; and (2) the Massachusetts law impermissibly
burdened U.S. foreign relations.7 5 In support of the first proposition,
the court cited the existence of numerous constitutional provisions
evidencing the Framers' intent to vest plenary power over foreign
affairs in the federal government. 76 The District Court also noted the
Supreme Court's consistent recognition of the exclusive role of the
77
federal government in foreign affairs.
In support of its finding that the Massachusetts law
impermissibly burdened U.S. foreign relations, the court cited
Zschernig v. Miller78 for the proposition that a law having more than
an indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries and a great
potential for disruption or embarrassment will be found to

71.
Haq, supra note 28 (quoting NFTC President Frank Kittredge).
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.
1998). The NFTC saluted the ruling, claiming that "our system of government was not
designed to allow the 50 states and hundreds of municipalities to conduct their own
individual foreign policies." USA- Judge Strikes Down Burma Sanctions, AP WIRE
(Nov. 8,
1998), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/corner/worldnews
other/231.html (quoting NFTC President Frank Kittredge).
75.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
76.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (giving Congress sole authority to
provide for the common defense), U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the
President to make treaties and appoint ambassadors), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls.
1-3 (prohibiting the states from making treaties, entering into agreements with other
countries, or imposing duties on imports and exports)).
77.
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (stating that
power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively"); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)
(noting that "[c]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government
and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the
several states").
78.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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unconstitutionally impinge on the federal government's exclusive
79
authority to regulate foreign affairs.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's
invalidation of the Massachusetts law as a violation of the exclusivity
doctrine and a burden on federal conduct of foreign affairs.8 0 In
addition, the First Circuit also found that the Massachusetts law
violated both the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the more
general dormant foreign affairs power, in accord with the Supreme
Court's 1968 decision in Zschernig v. Miller.8 1 Zschernig stands for
the proposition that state laws are unconstitutional, insofar as they
pose more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations,
82
even in the absence of any federal law or policy on the issue.
Last June, the Supreme Court affirmed the invalidation of
Massachusetts' Burma law.8 3 However, Justice Souter based his
opinion for a unanimous Court on the reasoning that the state
measure was preempted by the federal sanctions regime-and thus
84
abstained from examining the full array of constitutional issues.
The Court declined "to speak to field preemption as a separate issue
• . .or to pass on the First Circuit's rulings addressing the foreign
affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause."8 5
The Court held that Massachusetts' law undermined three
elements of the federal Burma sanctions regime,8 6 stating that any
state law that creates an obstacle to executing Congress' objectives is
preempted.8 7 First, the Court found that the state law undermined
the flexibility, authority, and discretion expressly afforded the
President by Congress in the statute imposing sanctions.8 8
This
"plenitude of Executive authority" was dispositive of the preemption
issue for the Court: the "fullness" of the authority granted the
President by Congress "shows the importance in the congressional
mind of reaching that result. It is simply implausible that Congress
would have gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had
been willing to compromise his effectiveness by deference to [state
laws]."89

79.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290-91 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35).
80.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)
(affirming Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287).
81.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 76-77.
82.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (holding that "even in the absence of a treaty, a
State's policy may disturb foreign relations...").
83.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
84.
Id. at 373.
85.
Id. at 374.
86.
Id. at 373.
87.
Id. at 372.
88.
Id. at 373-74.
89.
Id. at 376.
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Second, Justice Souter outlined substantive differences between
the state and federal approaches. 90 Federal sanctions banned only
new investment in Burma, while the state law penalized pre-existing
operations. 9 1 Furthermore, the federal ban targeted only U.S.
companies, while the state law extended to foreign businesses as
well. 92 To the Court, these differences were not neutralized by the
fact that the state and federal sanctions shared the same goals, or by
the possibility of complying with both sets of restrictions.9"
Finally, the opinion found the state law at odds with Congress'
intent that the President undertake multilateral efforts to bring
democracy to Burma. 94 On this score, Justice Souter highlighted
evidence that state measures such as the Massachusetts law had in
95
fact proved a distraction to international efforts on the Burma front.
Because the Court based its decision on Congressional intent,
Crosby does not explore the limits of state and local action in other
foreign policy contexts. The Court carefully refused to speculate on
how it would have ruled on the anti-apartheid divestment measures
passed by many states in the 1980s. 96 In the face of the Court's
failure to confront directly all the constitutional issues present in
Crosby, the debate over how federalism principles should apply in the
realm of foreign relations is unlikely to subside.

IV. U.S.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERALISM

A. ForeignAffairs Exceptionalism: The Orthodox View
The legal analysis of U.S. foreign relations has historically
differed from the analysis of domestic law. 97 Early analysts of the
Constitution insisted that the Framers intended national uniformity
in dealing with international issues. 98 This helps to explain why
foreign affairs law appears immune to the resurgence of federalism in
the courts. 99
Indeed, as scholars, attorneys, and judges have
rethought-some would say rediscovered-the role of federalism in

Id. at 373-74.
90.
91.
Id. at 374.
92.
Id. at 379.
93.
Id. at 376.
94.
Id. at 380.
95.
Id. at 384-85.
96.
Id. at 387.
97.
Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223
(1999).
Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommend Analysis, 83 AM.
98.
J. INT'L. L. 832 (1989).
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1617.
99.
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the U.S. legal system, the gap between the constitutional analysis of
domestic laws and foreign affairs laws has remained greatest on
10 0
issues of federalism.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has reexamined the
relationship between Congress and the states in a variety of contexts
and reinvigorated federalism by constraining or invalidating
Congressional actions as an intrusion on state power. 1 1 Despite this
spate of new thinking on federalism, however, the Court's emerging
concern with rediscovering state rights through analysis of text and
original intent has not spilled over into an equally probing inquiry
into state rights in areas touching upon foreign affairs. Nevertheless,
this discrepancy is not entirely surprising, given that most legal
scholars are accustomed to thinking about U.S. federalism and states'
10 2
roles largely in domestic terms.
Thus, despite the reemergence of federalism as a valid and even
guiding legal principle, few have challenged the proposition that
states have little or no role to play on the international stage. 10 3 One
commentator has termed this "the exclusivity principle, under which
the federal government alone enjoys the capacity to conduct the
nation's foreign relations.' 10 4 Others refer to the belief that foreign
affairs is exclusively the province of the federal government as the
orthodox view.10 5 Regardless of its label, this notion has come to
dominate U.S. foreign policy jurisprudence since the early years of
the twentieth century, with the Supreme Court and most
commentators finding state and local laws to be unconstitutional if

100.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1224.
101.
Curtis A. Bradley, A New American ForeignAffairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1089, 1100 (1999); see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as an unconstitutional expansion
of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not require the states to
administer a federal regulatory program); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding that the Commerce Clause did not support federal legislation criminalizing
knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) (holding that Congress does not possess the power under the Constitution to
compel a state to dispose of radioactive waste generated within its borders).
102.
Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1441, 1441-42 (1994).
103.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1224. According to at least one prominent
historian of foreign affairs jurisprudence, the distinction between domestic
constitutional analysis and foreign affairs law has long existed: "Federalism . . .
appeared irrelevant to the conduct of foreign affairs even before it began to be a
wasting force in American life generally-before we became one nation economically,
and moved toward welfare government disregarding state lines, before the power of the
States was theirs only by grace of Congress and by political realities rather than
constitutional compulsion." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
228 (1972).
104.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1224.
105.
Goldsmith, supranote 21, at 1617.
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they impede the federal government's ability to conduct foreign
106
policy.
A justification for the exclusivity principle commonly invoked by
orthodox commentators on foreign affairs law is the purported need
10 7
for the United States to "speak with one voice" in foreign relations.
As this adage indicates, the rule is justified as much by functional
concerns as by purely legal arguments; without constraints on state
foreign
power, individual states will be free to conduct their own
l08
policies, which may result in adverse consequences for all.
Adhering to the orthodox view, the Supreme Court has
consistently protected the role assigned to the federal government in
the area of foreign affairs as an exclusive one. 10 9 Indeed, on every
major question involving federalism and foreign affairs between 1900
and World War II, the Court ultimately resolved the issue in favor of
the Executive as the nation's principal foreign policymaker. 1 10
This trend has continued to the present, with only one recent
sign that the revival of federalism may affect foreign affairs. 1 ' That
sign came in 1998, when the Supreme Court denied a stay of
execution to Angel Breard, a Paraguayan citizen executed by the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 112 The Court denied the stay even
though Virginia had failed to provide Breard with consular notice, as
required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations," 3 and
even though the International Court of Justice issued a nonbinding
order to the United States to delay the execution. 114 Interestingly, in
Breard, the Departments of State and Justice issued amicus briefs
agreeing with Virginia that the federal government lacked any

106.
Ramsey, supra note 10, at 342 (citing Lewis Henkin, InternationalLaw as
Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984)).
See generally Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation? Federal Power vs.
107.
"States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277 (1999) (criticizing the
argument that states should not be preempted entirely from acting in ways that
implicate foreign affairs).
108.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1225.
109.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 290 (D. Mass.
1998); see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (holding that "[p]ower
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively"); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (stating that
"[c]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not
and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several
states").
110.
G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of
ForeignRelations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
111.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1101.
112.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-75 (1998).
113.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T.
77, 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 293-94.
114.
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay
v. United States), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9), reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 810, 819 (1998).
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constitutional ,power to interfere in Virginia's decision to exercise its

core police power of execution.1 15 Nevertheless, the Court was not
swayed by the federal government's acquiescence in Virginia's
action.11 6
B. The Revisionist View

Despite its ascendancy, some commentators have criticized the
exclusivity principle." 7 In particular, scholars have questioned the
principle's rationale in light of the dramatic changes that have
118
occurred in international politics during the last ten years.
Proponents of this argument concede that the Cold War raised the
stakes of international diplomacy too high to allow states to
undermine the federal government's direction of U.S. foreign
relations." 9 However, given the end of the Cold War, the demise of
the Soviet Union, and the increasing extent to which a global
economy and global communications blur the line between foreign
and domestic affairs, revisionists argue that it may be time to
reevaluate American foreign affairs law. 120 They propose a new
framework, in which states assume the status of demi-sovereigns
under international law.121 The call for a re-examination of the
relationship among the federal, state, and local governments on
matters of international affairs is only likely to increase, as
globalization makes separating domestic and foreign spheres for
12 2
purposes of federalism analysis more difficult.
Although the exclusivity principle is firmly embedded in the
orthodox view of U.S. foreign affairs law, its basis in the Constitution
is uncertain. 123 The orthodox view draws much of its strength from a
functional argument in support of federal exclusivity in foreign
affairs. The need for uniformity in foreign affairs is so great, the
argument runs, that it "seems overwhelmingly to mitigate against a
jurisdictions to
constitutional regime permitting innumerable local
24
chart their own cacophony of conflicting policies.'
This functional argument finds its legal justification in the vague
confidence that there must be a broad constitutional principle that

115.

Bradley, supra note 101, at 1101.

116.

Id.

117.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1225 (citing Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
512 U.S. 298 (1994)).
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1225; see generally Goldsmith supra note 21.
118.
119.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1241 (noting that the Cold War "brought about the
high mark of federal exclusivity...").
120.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1089.
121.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1225.
122.
Friedman, supra note 102, at 1442.
123.
Id. at 1466-71.
124.
Ramsey, supra note 10, at 344.
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makes foreign policy exclusively a national preserve. 125 This view is
not without support from the Framers. In particular, adherents
frequently cite James Madison's famous dictum in this regard: "If we
are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
126
other nations."
The revisionist foreign affairs jurisprudence challenges the
functional rationale of the federal exclusivity principle. 12 7 It also
questions the central premise underlying foreign relations law,
arguing that "the Constitution's assignment of foreign relations
powers to the federal government entails a self-executing exclusion of
state authority.' 128 Indeed, the most radical revisionists contend that
there is no generalized, non-Article VI preemption of state action in
foreign policy matters. 129 They further argue that under the original
understanding of the Constitution, state laws interfering with federal
foreign policy should stand despite the interference, unless
130
preempted in the ordinary constitutional manner.
Most conflicts between federalism and foreign affairs arise when
a state's exercise of authority clearly allocated and reserved to it
under the Tenth Amendment affects U.S. foreign affairs. 13 1 This fact
makes it especially important to distinguish between exclusive
The Constitution
federal power and plenary federal power.' 3 2
establishes plenary federal power over foreign affairs by five means.
Under Article I, section 8, clauses 1 and 3 of the Constitution,
Congress possesses sole authority to provide for the common defense
and regulate commerce with foreign nations. 133 Article II, section 2,
clause 2 authorizes the President to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors. 134 Article I, section 10, clauses 1 through 3 prohibit the
states from executing treaties, entering into agreements with other
countries, or imposing duties on imports and exports.' 35 Article VI,
section 1, clause 2 establishes the supremacy of these federal
enactments over state laws, l3 6 and Article III extends the federal
judicial power to cases involving these federal enactments and to
other transnational controversies. 137 Together, these provisions give

125.
126.
1987).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 273 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
Id.
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1641-42.
Ramsey, supra note 10, at 346.
Id.
Maier, supra note 98, at 833.
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1619.

133.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3.
art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
art. III.
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the federal government comprehensive power to conduct foreign
relations without interference from the states.'3 8
C. ForeignAffairs Jurisprudence:The First One Hundred Years
The principles governing foreign relations jurisprudence were
not always so clearly in favor of forcing states to vacate the
diplomatic arena and leave the federal government as the sole U.S.
participant on the world stage. 139 As late as the turn of the century,
foreign policy jurisprudence was based on three primary
40
assumptions, all of which may appear odd by today's standards.
Most notably, courts treated the exercise of foreign relations powers
as a constitutional exercise, controlled by the enumerated and
reserved powers provided in the Constitution. 141 Also striking in
earlier jurisprudence was the then-dominant view that, although the
Constitution specifically conferred the treaty power on the federal
government and prohibited the states from entering into treaties, the
exercise of any foreign relations powers by the federal government
nevertheless needed to respect the reserved powers of the states142
powers reserved to them as sovereigns by the Constitution.
The third principle that informed foreign policy jurisprudence
prior to twentieth century was the belief that the principal means to
enter into international agreements was the treaty-making
process. 143 As mentioned earlier in the description of the federal
government's plenary powers to make foreign policy, the Constitution
delineates the treaty-making process, 144 distributes the responsibility
for making treaties between the President and the Senate, 145 and
forbids the states from engaging in separate treaty-making. 146 Taken
together, these assumptions
produced. what can be called a 'treaty-centered' consciousness in the
orthodox regime of constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence at the
turn of the twentieth century. Courts and commentators assumed that
most international agreements would be treaties, that most agreements

138.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840) (explaining that "one
of the main objects of the Constitution [was] to make us, as far as regarded our foreign
relations, one people, and one nation").
139.
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1622. Indeed, "contrary to the suggestions of
many courts and scholars, there was no judicially enforceable, self-executing federal
foreign relations power for the first 175 years of our constitutional history." Id.
140.
White, supra note 110, at 8.
141.
Id. at 8-9.
142.
Id. at 9.
143.
Id.
144.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-3.
145.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
146.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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would be entered into by the federal government, and, that all
14 7
agreements would be subject to the limitations of the Constitution.

Because foreign affairs jurisprudence operated under these three
assumptions, constitutional analysis of foreign affairs cases was
148
similar to that of domestic police power cases.
While this reasoning may seem simplistic today, it functioned
well prior to the development of the enormous foreign policymaking
apparatus at the disposal of the President, which includes the
creation or tremendous growth of such executive branch agencies as
the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Central
Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. The separationof-powers paradigm embraced by foreign policy jurisprudence at the
turn of the century anticipated that the federal government's conduct
of foreign relations powers would be easily characterized, because
that jurisprudence presupposed that treaties, initiated by the
President and ratified by the Senate, and tariff legislation, initiated
by Congress, would compose essentially the entire spectrum of U.S.
149
foreign policy.
This paradigm provided considerable room for states to operate
in matters implicating foreign relations. Indeed, throughout the
nineteenth century, states "engaged in a series of legislative efforts
that were unmistakably the province of foreign affairs."'150 These
efforts included criminal extradition, immigration regulation, and
retaliation against foreign nations for restricting domestic
corporations' opporfunity to do business in sanctioned nations. 151
The considerable power wielded by states over matters that involved
foreign affairs but did not infringe upon the federal government's
plenary powers led one historian of U.S. foreign affairs jurisprudence
to conclude that:
Orthodox late nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence took
for granted that the exercise of even enumerated federal powers would
take place against a backdrop of state reserved powers. This meant
that considerable room existed for the potential exercise of state power
in areas, including foreign affairs, where the national government had
been granted, but did not exercise, plenary power. And not only did
states exercise foreign relations powers, late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century courts and commentators viewed the exercise of
national foreign affairs powers as raising the same specter of potential

encroachment into the residuum of reserved state power that was
raised by the exercise of national powers in domestic cases. Orthodox

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

White, supra note 110, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence was characterized by a
152
highly developed reserved-powers-centered consciousness.

Despite its domination of U.S. foreign affairs jurisprudence for the
first one hundred years of U.S. history, this separation-of-powers
paradigm came under stress as the nation's presence on the world
stage grew. It was abandoned completely in the transformation of
153
foreign affairs jurisprudence that occurred early in this century.
154
D. ForeignAffairs Jurisprudencein The American Century

The transformation of U.S. foreign affairs law that occurred
during the early part of the twentieth century represented a
significant departure from the orthodox view that prevailed in the
nineteenth century. 155 The themes that characterized nineteenth
century U.S. foreign affairs jurisprudence-the perception of foreign
affairs as a constitutional exercise, governed by enumerated and
reserved powers, an emphasis on the treaty-making process, and a
healthy respect for the reserved powers of the states under the Tenth
Amendment-were abandoned in the twentieth century, giving rise to
a new, orthodox view of foreign affairs. 156 Three themes dominate
the orthodox view of foreign affairs law in the twentieth century: (1)
Presidential preeminence in foreign affairs; (2) the irrelevance of
federalism restraints on federal government foreign affairs powers,
sometimes known as foreign affairs exceptionalism; and (3) judicial
57
lawmaking to protect federal prerogatives in foreign affairs.'
The elevation of the Executive to a dominant position in the
conduct of U.S. foreign affairs was endorsed most famously in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.158 In Curtiss-Wright, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Congressional
resolution authorizing the President to place a ban on the sale of

152.
Id. at 21-22.
153.
See id. at 11.
154.
The term "American Century" was coined by Henry Luce, founding
publisher of Life magazine and influential political commentator and activist. See
MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT TO
REAGAN 158 (1990).

155.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1090 (noting that "Ted White has given us an
illuminating account of the transformation in American foreign affairs law that
occurred during the early parts of the twentieth century"); see generally White, supra
note 110. But cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of CurtissWright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999) (arguing that the orthodox view that
developed during the twentieth century was not, in fact, a radical break from the
nineteenth century orthodox view).
156.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1091 (describing this as "the twentieth-century
view of American foreign affairs law").
157.
Id.
158.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1091.
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arms by U.S. companies to countries engaged in conflict in Central
America. 159 The Court rejected the nondelegation argument raised
by the resolution's opponents, reasoning that "as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of foreign relations," the President
requires special flexibility and discretion in guiding U.S. foreign
affairs. 160 More significantly, the Court also expressed the view that
in some instances, the federal government's power over the nation's
foreign affairs does not depend on affirmative grants of power from
the Constitution; rather, they are derived from the notion that these
powers passed to the nation as a whole on its founding, "as a member
of the family of nations."'161 Curtiss-Wright is particularly important
because it represents the first time that the Supreme Court endorsed
the proposition that a general foreign affairs power resided in the
162
federal government.
For orthodox students of foreign affairs jurisprudence, the
revisionist view poses a particular threat to the President's
predominant role in charting the diplomatic course of the United
States, since it strips him of some Executive prerogatives that have
accreted through the years. 163 Thus, "when the Supreme Court
speaks of non-Article VI preemption of state activities that 'impair
the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy,' it means the
President's foreign policy-because, of course, state activities
impairing congressional foreign policy or treaty-based foreign policy
1 64
would be preempted by Article VI."'
A second component of the twentieth century orthodox view is
the apparent irrelevance of federalism to foreign affairs. 165 The idea
that state action is preempted by foreign affairs does not depend on
textual arguments, because the absence of state power in the field
predates the adoption of the Constitution. Instead, it is based on the
proposition that, since the colonization of the United States, the
166
citizens of the states acted as one in matters of foreign affairs.
Under this analysis, any state statute that has more than an
incidental or indirect effect on foreign countries is preempted by the
Significantly, the federal
powers of the federal government. 167

159.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
160.
Id. at 320; see Bradley, supra note 101, at 1091-92.
161.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
162.
Maier, supra note 98, at 832.
163.
See generally Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the
Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295 (criticizing the
injection of federalism analysis into foreign affairs jurisprudence).
164.
Ramsey, supra note 10, at 347 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
440 (1968)) (emphasis in original).
165.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1093.
166.
Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionalityof State
and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 508-09 (1987).
167.
Id. at 509.
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government need not exercise its powers in foreign affairs for a court
to preempt state laws:
The Court has located principles teaching 'that the Constitution itself
excludes such state intrusions even when the federal branches have not
acted.'
This 'dormant' foreign policy power requires a court to
determine the likely effect on foreign policy that a state statute will
have. These determinations, however, must be made without reference
to any particular federal statement on the matter, whether it be a
treaty, federal statute, or executive proclamation. With no text from
which to glean federal intention to preempt, a court must resort to a
balancing of state interests against the impact of the state law on
foreign affairs concerns-a test not unlike that used in the dormant
168
commerce clause cases.

An early but famous example of this view is the Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri v. Holland,l6 9 in which the Court implicitly
endorsed the idea that Congress' treaty power is not subject to
federalism limitations. 170 This line of reasoning is in keeping with
the preemption doctrine that dominates modern foreign affairs
jurisprudence.
More recently, in Zschernig v. Miller,171 the Supreme Court
invalidated a state law that unquestionably would be constitutional
in a purely domestic context. In Zschernig, the Court struck down a
state statute because the Court believed it had a direct impact upon
foreign relations and might adversely affect the power of the federal
government to conduct foreign policy' 7 2-this despite the fact that
both political branches of the federal government supported the law
as a valid exercise of state police power. 173 Moreover, the Court cited
no showing of an adverse effect on relations with East Germany, the
nation with whom U.S. foreign policy ostensibly might suffer as a
result of the state action. 174 Zschernig represents the Supreme
Court's last major pronouncement on federal preemption of state law
based on structural analysis, at least in the province of foreign
175
affairs.
The third major component of the twentieth century orthodox
view is the notion that courts should not only review legislative
actions but also make law when necessary to protect the national
government's prerogative in foreign affairs. 176 The justification for
this notion is that since "the nation must speak with one voice, not

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1093-94.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 441.
Bradley, supra note 101, at 1095.
Maier, supra note 98, at 836.
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fifty . . . judge-made federal foreign relations law constitutes that
177
voice until the federal political branches say otherwise.
The main case supporting the conventional view of the role of the
federal judiciary in foreign affairs is Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, in which the Court held that federal common law
incorporates customary international law (CIL) and, thus, that
international law trumps state law.178 Orthodox adherents regard
CIL as self-executing federal common law, which courts may apply
without Congressional approval or enactment.
This conception is essentially as follows. Foreign affairs is a category
distinct from domestic affairs. Although the Constitution limits federal
power in domestic affairs, federal power is plenary and exclusive with
respect to foreign affairs. This exclusive federal foreign affairs power
encompasses the interpretation and application of CIL. If the federal
political branches have not embodied CIL in a federal treaty or statute,
the judicial arm of the federal government should interpret and apply
CIL as a matter of federal common law, subject only to subsequent
federal political branch revision. Federal courts have thus applied CIL
without political branch authorization .... 179

In Sabbatino, the Court relied on a structural analysis of the
Constitution to find that state authority may be preempted by the
federal exclusivity principle even when the state action does not
actually interfere with the national conduct of foreign affairs.180
Sabbatino's is important because it represents the Court's clear
recognition that the judiciary, in exercising its federal common law
powers, need not demonstrate actual state interference with federal
decision making or conflict with existing national policy; instead,
courts may rely upon the logic of the constitutional structure to
resolve matters of national-state conflict in foreign affairs.1 81
Sabbatino and Zschernig marked a significant break with prior
law. 182 Nevertheless, since those decisions, scholars as well as lower
courts have embraced with enthusiasm the idea of a judge-made,
83
federal common law of foreign relations.'
This doctrine of a federal common law of foreign relations also
has been applied under the auspices of the dormant Foreign
Preemption analysis under the dormant
Commerce Clause.' 8 4
an anti-discrimination
involves
Clause
Foreign Commerce
determination similar to that made in preemption analysis under the

Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1621.
177.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964).
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IncorporationofInternationalLaw, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2260, 2261 (1998).
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Id.
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dormant domestic Commerce Clause: the court asks whether the
state act facially discriminates against foreign commerce or has
substantial discriminatory effects.'8 5
In its application to state laws that intersect with foreign affairs,
however, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis "imposes an
additional, and independent, prohibition: the state . . . must not

prevent the federal government from speaking with 'one voice' in
foreign relations.' 18 6 Functionally, this one-voice test is identical to
the dormant foreign relations preemption analysis; courts must
analyze the extent to8 7which state law will offend foreign nations and
provoke retaliation.'
The functional arguments for granting the federal government
exclusive control over foreign affairs and completely preempting state
and local action in that arena under the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis include the following. First, the national interest in
achieving foreign relations objectives requires that other nations
perceive U.S. foreign policy as unified and coherent. 188 State and
local action, especially if inconsistent with the federal
administration's foreign policy, may thus undermine the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations and the credibility of the federal government's
negotiating posture by conveying the appearance of disagreement or
incoherence among the different levels of government. 8 9
Second, state and local activities may interfere with national
foreign relations by antagonizing or injuring foreign nations, their
citizens, or their economic interests.1 90 According to this view, it is
inappropriate and irresponsible for states and localities to adopt
policies that may harm the interests of their fellow states or the
nation as a whole. 191 Thus, as with the federal exclusivity principle,
the validity of a state's law turns on a court's assessment of its
192
implications for U.S. foreign relations.

185.
(1979)).
186.
187.

188.

Id. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 1637.
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Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83
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192.
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V.

DETERMINING WHETHER STATE ACTIONS VIOLATE THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN AFFAIRS: TOWARD
A NEW FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

According to Professor Harold Maier, a noted commentator in the
field:
The principle of federalism echoes a fundamental principle of
democracy: that governmental decisions made at the local level are
more likely to reflect the will of the people most directly affected by
them. As long as the United States continues to exist as a federal
nation, decisions in cases involving possible state intrusion into foreign
affairs must continue to strike an appropriate balance between
preservation of the values of local self-government and the need for
193
national uniformity in matters of international affairs.

Despite the recent spate of federalism decisions, however, it is
difficult to glean principles from U.S. foreign affairs jurisprudence
that instruct concerned observers how to strike the appropriate
balance-where, in other words, to draw the line between permissible
and unconstitutional state actions that intersect with national foreign
affairs. It is this task with which revisionists are most concerned.
The revisionist approach this Note suggests does not propose to
impose federalism or enumerated powers limits on the federal
194
Many
government's authority to conduct foreign relations.
unconstitutional,
are
undoubtedly
affairs
infringements on foreign
since any state and local activity affecting foreign policy is preempted
by the Supremacy Clause of Article VI if it conflicts with federal laws
be precluded in
or treaties. 195 Furthermore, state activities may 196
limitations.
constitutional
specific
by
some instances
The orthodox view of foreign affairs law invalidates state laws as
unconstitutional encroachments on the federal government's
exclusive power over foreign relations even in the absence of a
controlling and applicable federal statute, treaty, or specific
constitutional provision. 19 7 It is this aspect of the orthodox view that
the revisionist approach to foreign affairs jurisprudence disputes. In
other words, where Congress and the President have not exercised
their plenary powers to preempt state action on the international
scene, and where such action is not forbidden by other concerns,
courts should not invalidate state and local government actions
merely because they involve foreign affairs.

193.

Maier, supra note 98, at 837.
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Id.
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Under this analysis, the Supreme Court should have upheld
Massachusetts' Burma law in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council. Congress did not act to preempt the Massachusetts law
when it enacted sanctions of its own. Indeed, the purposes of the two
sets of sanctions were essentially identical. Furthermore, Congress
had three years to preempt the state law before Crosby was decided,
yet it chose not to exercise its affirmative preemption prerogative.
Thus, not even implied preemption can withstand scrutiny as a valid
basis for striking down Massachusetts' Burma law.
The Court's decision cannot be justified on functional grounds,
either. Although Japan and the EU threatened retaliation against
the United States for Massachusetts' Burma law, Congressional
enactment and Executive implementation of similar sanctionswhich surely angered those nations even more-eliminates that
avenue of argument as a legitimate grounds for the opinion.
Nor did Massachusetts' law pose an invalid restriction on the
Executive's authority once the President issued an Executive Order
imposing sanctions on Burma in 1997. As with the Congressional
enactment, the President's sanctions-like those of Massachusettswere intended to further the cause of democracy in Burma and voice
U.S. disapproval of Burma's ruling junta. Thus, the President
retained the full grant of authority given to him by Congress, 198 even
in light of Massachusetts' procurement law.
The only ground on which the sanctions might be struck under
the revisionist framework is the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
Although the Court declined to undertake this analysis, it is likely
the Court would have invalidated the state law on this basis, as well.
Whether this decision would have been correct would depend on
whether the interest of Massachusetts in curtailing the investment of
state funds in Burmese enterprises outweighed the possible damage
to its sister states' foreign commerce.
Under the revisionist approach, however, investment decisions
like those at issue in Crosby would lie outside the Zschernig
preemption doctrine as a matter of policy. 19 9 If Massachusetts can
show that by investing state funds in or using them to buy from
companies doing business with Burma it is subjecting itself to a
substantial risk of loss-due to political turbulence in Burma-or to
substantial disruptions at home-due to protests over the immorality
of such investment-this showing "should outweigh a few 'potential
'200
embarrassments' with regard to foreign nations.
State and local governments are increasingly involved in a wide
variety of activities in the global marketplace that intersect in ways

198.
199.
200.

Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
Lewis, supra note 166, at 514.
Id. at 515.
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large and small with foreign affairs. Far from being problematic, this
is a positive and healthy development for the states as laboratories of
democracy. Indeed, some argue that recognizing a role for states in
foreign policy matters serves a structural separation of powers
purpose. A legal framework that precludes states from acting in
foreign affairs might allocate too much power to the President to
20 1
dictate foreign policy.
By making room for a relatively small measure of state power, in
the absence of statutory preemption or explicit constitutional
preclusion, the revisionist framework constrains executive tendencies
Thus, to some
to engage in unconstitutional policymaking. 20 2
revisionists, the real issue posed by foreign policy federalism is the
scope of executive power in conducting foreign relations.2 0 3 This
inquiry into the structural purposes of the reigning doctrine of foreign
affairs preemption is one salutary characteristic of the revisionist
approach to federalism and foreign affairs.
Courts should also conduct a more thorough analysis of the
effects of a state law before' preempting that law under the foreign
affairs power. Justices White and Harlan seemed to recognize this in
Zschernig, where they supported the traditional-now revisionistview that state law should be preempted only upon a showing that it
actually interfered with the federal government's conduct of foreign
20 4
affairs.
Because this analysis fully recognizes the explicit preemption
powers granted to Congress and the President by the Constitution, it
preserves ultimate federal authority over the nation's foreign affairs
and assures that the nation will speak with one voice on matters of
national importance. In reality, it signifies not so much the creation
of a dramatic new doctrine as "a shift in constitutional presumptions,
moving from deep skepticism to general tolerance of state activity
This attempt to accommodate
involving foreign relations." 20 5
legitimate State interests with the need for an effective, vigorous, and
unified U.S. foreign policy introduces federalism's flexibility and
healthy respect for the states into the too rigid constraints of orthodox
foreign affairs jurisprudence.
Finally, the end of the Cold War, the spread of a "democratic
peace," 20 6 and the growing interconnectedness of global commerce
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Ramsey, supra note 10, at 429.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
204. Zscheridg, 389 U.S. at 458-62 (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 462 (White, J.,
dissenting).
205.
Spiro, supra note 97, at 1226.
See generally BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE:
206.
PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993) (arguing that the spread of
democracy in recent years reduces the possibility of a major war because democracies
are reluctant to declare war against one another).
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and communications have lessened the risks of allowing states a
limited sphere of action in foreign affairs when their recognized
interests-such as protecting their citizens through the police
power-overlap with issues involving other nations. While these
developments have by no means eliminated the constant potential for
embarrassing or even dangerous disputes in international affairs,
they have lessened it to the point that it no longer justifies invoking a
tenuous, extra-constitutional doctrine to preempt state powers that
were recognized for the first one hundred years of the Republic.
As one commentator has recognized, these historic, international
developments greatly reduce the potential threat of severe
externalities that undergirds the functional justification for the
exclusivity principle. 20 7 The changing structure of international
relations will permit nations to choose to tailor their retaliation to
subnational units, such as states. This "innovation of targeted
retaliation ...could mark the emergence of a new doctrine of subnational responsibility of the states as demi-sovereigns under
international law.1208 In this changing international environment,
the functional justifications for federal exclusivity in foreign affairsthe bedrock of the orthodox view of U.S. foreign affairs jurisprudence
in the twentieth century-no longer stands as a sufficient reason to
segregate federalism's precepts from foreign affairs matters.

VI. CONCLUSION
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council did not provide
proponents of a revisionist analysis of federalism and foreign affairs
with their hoped-for break with the twentieth century orthodox view
of federal exclusivity in the field of foreign policy making.
Nevertheless, because the case was decided on relatively narrow
grounds, it has not emerged as the final word on the subject or
precluded a revival of federalism concepts and textual constraints in
foreign affairs law.
As long as the Supreme Court continues to endorse the
legitimate role of the states in domestic affairs, pressure will mount
from commentators, states, cities, and activists for the Court likewise
to return to an understanding of foreign affairs that is closer to that
of the Framers. Furthermore, the advent of globalization and the
growing ability of nations to target their retaliation against
subnational actors have greatly weakened the functional argument
for abrogating states' rights in the field of foreign affairs.
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Given these trends, it seems only a matter of time until the tide
turns, and courts and commentators endorse a framework of foreign
affairs law analysis more closely resembling that which prevailed in
United States for much of its history.
James J. Pascoe*
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